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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On 19/20th June 2000, the Santa Maria da Feira European Council adopted the Common 
Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean region. It was the third Common Strategy 
adopted by the European Council, after the two previous Common Strategies on Russia and 
Ukraine. On the table there was the desire to articulate a comprehensive, cross-pillar instrument 
to deal with the Mediterranean countries, covering all the dimensions of the European Foreign 
Policy and putting together, under the same umbrella, the policies and the instruments of the 
European Union and of the Member States. 
 
The present working paper aims at assessing the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean, 
taking into account its possible articulation as a coherent instrument of the European Foreign 
Policy. The study wants to answer some questions related to this instrument. The Common 
Strategy on the Mediterranean is an excellent case study and is a potential source of several 
questions about the external action of the European Union. Specifically, the present study has 
in mind two main questions to answer. Firstly, which are the main reasons behind the adoption 
of this instrument of the European Foreign Policy? In other words, which was/is the rationale for 
the existence of this Common Strategy? Secondly, which is the real impact of the Common 
Strategy? Which are its real achievements? 
 
In order to make the conductor wire effective, useful and structured all over the study, all the 
ideas exposed aim at falsifying or verifying the starting points of the study, that is the 
hypothesis. The author has in mind one basic assumption referring the Common Strategy on 
the Mediterranean, assumption that the development of the study will state as wrong or as false. 
This hypothesis consists on the idea that the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region 
was conceived as an instrument to articulate a coherent European Foreign Policy in an area 
where the European Union and its Member States have important interests in common.   
    
 
I. THE COMMON STRATEGY ON THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION 
 
 
An accurate examination of the functioning of the European Union dual system of foreign affairs 
shows the extraordinary complexity of foreign policy making and policy implementation by the 
Union. The resulting institutional constraints become particularly tangible if a policy touches vital 
interests of the Union and its Member States, because then the internal struggle for securing 
priorities and defending particular interests of all the actors involved becomes all the more 
intense1. The EU policy towards the Mediterranean definitely touches vital interests of Member 
States. As a result, this policy, if there is one policy, puts the entire foreign affairs system under 
considerable strain and the impact of the institutional constraints increases. The most important 
institutional effect in the Mediterranean policy is that the system makes of the EU a clearing 
house of different interests rather than an unitary actor with more or less clearly defined 
objectives and strategies. Is the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean (CSM) an effective 
tool to provide a general framework for the European Foreign Policy towards this region?         
 
 
1. Common Strategies: a New Instrument for a Coherent Foreign Policy  
 
 
Common Strategies are conceived as an instrument of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, but also cover other areas of the EU's external relations and are intended to be an 
improved mechanism for ensuring coherence across the range of external policies2. A CS may 
cover issues across the three pillars rather than CFSP alone and, crucially for the coherence of 
the European Foreign Policy, may draw upon capabilities and instruments from the European 
Community, the European Union and the Member States. In fact, the importance of CS for the 
co-ordination, coherence and effectiveness of external action is crucial3. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam, mainly to reflect two major concerns that arose over EU external action during the 
IGC of 1996-7, introduced the mechanism of the CS. The first concern was to respond to the 
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increasing demands of the integration of internal—or "cross-pillar"—policy-making4, where it 
was felt that the existing instruments and agencies of the EU were insufficiently co-ordinated or 
even able in the first place, to make a strategic impact. In particular, it was thought necessary to 
link the economic, financial and trade instruments at the disposal of the EC more closely with 
the EU's political and diplomatic objectives. The second concern was the consideration that 
important strategies of this kind should be decided at the highest level, in the European Council, 
and only at that level. In other words, CS is a response of the insufficiencies of the single 
institutional framework and a reaction of the pillar structure of the dual system of foreign affairs5.  
 
CS introduce an element of flexibility in CFSP, given that the decisions for its implementation 
are adopted by Qualified Majority Voting6. The amendments of the CFSP agreed in Amsterdam 
represent a compromise position with the requirements outlined above. The compromise 
restricted the broader extension of QMV through accepting a national veto on grounds of 
national interest and increased internal policy coherence (see Article 13.2 TEU). CS shall set 
out the objectives of the EU and MS in areas where the MS have important interests in 
common, the duration of the actions, and finally the means and resources available by the 
Union and the MS in order to achieve the objectives. Article 13 TEU states that CS is decided 
by the European Council on a proposal by the Council. The Council is in charge of the later 
implementation of the CS7. The decision of the Council to submit a CS to the European Council 
is taken by unanimity, and the actions for its implementation, that is Joint Actions and Common 
Positions, are taken by QMV. Unanimity applies in the case of decisions with military or defence 
implications and the Amsterdam Treaty expressly excludes them from QMV. 
 
From the outset, however, it appeared that this approach was dictated more by institutional 
ambitions than by a clear necessity to formulate the "common strategies" in question. One of 
these institutional questions was the extension of the use of QMV to CFSP decision-making, in 
order to create more flexible conditions for the implementation of policy. Not all MS were in 
agreement over the extent to which an extension of QMV would enhance the EU's international 
effectiveness. France and Germany linked the debate on this subject to an Italian proposal to 
promote foreign policy positions from “common platforms”, and a proposal on "enhanced co-
operation" between smaller groups of MS across a number of EU policy spheres. In reality, 
France and Germany introduced the new instrument of CS at a late stage of the proceedings8. 
France desired to have an overall, strategic instrument adopted by unanimity and with an 
intergovernmental character, meanwhile Germany wanted to enhance EFP making and 
introduce QVM in the second pillar.  
 
CS have been presented primarily as an instrument of the EU so as to improve its own working. 
At first sight, it seems hard to distinguish them from the principles and general guidelines for 
CFSP, set out by the European Council. Their purpose has been to create a new instrument 
providing more coherence and focus on areas of particular interest for the MS. In practice, CS 
contains more specific provisions, in lengthier texts, than the "common positions" hitherto 
adopted by the Council. In addition to MS, the Commission, in turn, may refer questions and 
submit proposals to the Council and is also fully associated in the representation of the EU in 
CFSP, and in the implementation of CS.  
 
The main innovation of CS in general may thus be to have increased the opportunities for 
implementing decision taken by QMV on CFSP matters, where this possibility was limited 
before. But Article 23.2 TEU arguably provides a stronger safeguard than the national veto 
claimed under the Luxembourg compromise. For the most part, the European Council is the 
final arbitrary body in the adoption of JA or CP over issues deemed to run counter to the 
national interests of MS, although in the last resort it cannot overrule a national veto9. Article 
23.3 TEU states that  "If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated 
reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by QMV, a 
vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by QMV, request that the matter be referred to 
the European Council for decision by unanimity."  
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2. The interests of the European Union in the Region 
 
After the end of the cold war the geopolitical landscape of Europe was completely altered. 
Instead of one dominating threat, several different conflicting situations challenged progressing 
Europe. That situation led the EU to deal more and more with the outside borders of Europe, 
even reaching the Mediterranean region. The special relationship between Europe and this 
region is characterised and stressed by a range of different factors, given the enormous 
importance of the Mediterranean region for the EU. This importance has different 
manifestations.  
 
In strategic terms, the Mediterranean region is crucial for the EU, given the geographical 
proximity of both basins, and can be considered as the south gateway of the EU10, that is the 
Europe’s “new abroad”. Europe is furthermore heavily dependent on the Middle East oil 
production. The political stability of the Gulf States is therefore a high priority, as has been 
negatively experienced during the seventies oil crisis. A further element, which makes the 
Mediterranean region extremely important for the EU, is the security dimension. The 
consolidation of a stable and secure zone in the Mediterranean is a key priority of the EFP, and 
this purpose is expressed in terms of both hard security and soft security. The existence of 
common problems in the region, such as the migration flows, the environmental concerns, the 
nuclear safety or the organised crime makes the articulation of a coherent and effective EFP in 
the Mediterranean much more urgent for the EU. Europe’s commitment to the democratisation 
of the southern Mediterranean region is primarily motivated by a security concern. The 
Barcelona Process has been fundamentally the pursuit of political and security objectives 
through economic and cultural means. The Mediterranean basin is the source of many 
intrastate and international conflicts, and while it would appear that the EU has little interest in 
intervening on the ground, few southern Mediterranean states can be regarded as stable. 
Above all, the situations in Algeria and the Middle East Peace Process are of continual concern 
to the Member States.  
 
In economic terms, the relationship between the southern and northern Mediterranean countries 
is essential for the EU. The enormous disparities that exist between the two basins have led to 
a strong economic component in the policy established. The trade exchanges, the investments, 
the financial flows, the energy supplies, the agriculture, the manufactures and the tourism are 
the main sectors of the economic relationships, which try to promote the development of the 
southern countries and establish a free trade area. Economically, the EU and the Mediterranean 
partner countries are more interdependent than is often recognised in the northern parts of the 
EU: in particular, southern Europe is heavily reliant on the CSM countries for its energy needs. 
Economically, the Mediterranean partners all lag very far behind the EU, with the exception of 
Cyprus, Malta and Israel. Finally, several historical and cultural links exist between the two 
basins. The massive colonial presence of the European countries in the Mediterranean, and the 
fact that we are speaking of a region which constitutes a common space for Christianity, 
Islamism and Judaism, ask for a common framework of co-operation.  
 
Is the EU facing the challenge? Taking into account the forthcoming enlargement, the 
increasing integration of all political areas as well as conflict situations in and around Europe, 
the question is to be put how the EU is to deal with these challenges. Is the EU prepared for 
these new dangers and will it be up to the outside expectations? Given the difference between 
the EC external relations and other areas of EFP, a coherent appearance in the Mediterranean 
is expected from the EU in foreign policy.  
  
 
3. The common strategy. Evidence and Analysis  
3.1. The road to the Common Strategy 
 
The CSM, as an instrument of the EU, was not constructed in the vacuum. It had many 
important precedents, as far as the EFP regarding the Mediterranean region had been 
established over the nineties. We can consider that there are three main turmoils in the 
adoption of the CSM. The first important event was the Barcelona Conference, taken place on 
27-28 November 1995 under the auspices of the Spanish Presidency. The Barcelona 
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Conference gave birth to the EMP, a process with the general objective of turning the 
Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation guaranteeing peace, 
stability and prosperity11. The EMP represents the general and well-structured framework for the 
Mediterranean policy of the EU, and is a crucial basis for the later adoption of the CSM. The 
scope of the EMP process has been extensive, covering three chapters of activities under the 
headings of political and security, economic and financial, human and cultural partnerships. 
Unfortunately, during its first five years, Barcelona has made only limited progress towards its 
objectives.  
 
The second precedent was the Vienna European Council, held on December 1998. The 
Conclusions stressed the need of the EU to play a more active role in international affairs and to 
establish a kind of more general, strategic and long-term perspective in its foreign policy. The 
European Council “invited the Council, in accordance with the recommendations in its report to 
prepare CS on Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean region, taking specifically into account the 
Barcelona Process and the Middle East Peace Process, as well as on the Western Balkans, on 
the understanding that the first CS will be on Russia. When identifying further subjects for CS, 
thematic subjects should also be considered”12. This meant that the EU had to elaborate a 
concrete policy towards its direct neighbourhood, namely the Newly Independent States13, the 
Balkan countries and the Mediterranean region, specially taking into account the MEPP and the 
EMP. The CEEC, given its perspective of accession and the good development of the 
enlargement process, were excluded of this general planning. The follow up of the Vienna 
European Council, once the Treaty of Amsterdam had come into force, was very fast and 
resulted crucial for the future of EFP. The mentioned objective to set up an overall instrument of 
EFP almost obliged the EU to make use of the just created instrument of the second pillar, the 
CS.  
 
The European machinery soon started to work. The first CS was referred to Russia, and was 
adopted during the Cologne European Council, on 3-4 June 1999. In relation to the Southern 
Balkans, after the 11-week NATO’s bombing campaign, the same European Council adopted 
the Stability Pact on the Balkans. The proposed second CS was substituted by another 
instrument, which implied a high involvement of third actors and a completely different approach 
of the EFP. Six months later, the crucial Helsinki European Council, held on 10-11 December 
1999, adopted the CSU. The third precedent of the CSM was the Berlin European Council, on 
23-24 March 1999. The Conclusions contained the basis for the later policy of the EU towards 
the Middle East region. The solemn declaration adopted repeated the most important guidelines 
of the EFP regarding this region, and it stressed that the European strategy in this policy area 
has some basic points14. 
  
The preparation of the CSM started in July 1999 by discussion in COREPER and in Political 
Committee, where the general guidelines for the strategy were decided on15. The case for 
adopting a EU internal strategy towards the Mediterranean during the course of 1999-2000 was 
not entirely clear. An immediate danger existed that the CS would replicate or indeed confuse 
the priorities of the EU towards the Mediterranean unless it offered a clearer set of priorities and 
something substantially new to the existing process. A further problem consisted of explaining 
to Mediterranean partners what the purpose of this new "EU-only" instrument would be, where 
the EMP had been negotiated in conjunction with these partners.  
 
Coming after the CS, the EU appears to have chosen the Mediterranean as the next in line for 
reasons of regional symmetry argued by southern EU members, rather than on its own merit. In 
drafting the first texts in the autumn of 1999, the Finnish EU Presidency encountered 
considerable difficulties in encapsulating the varied aims of different EU members. By common 
agreement, the text prepared by the end of the Finnish Presidency was dropped as being 
inadequate to the task of the proposed strategy. Under the Portuguese Presidency, MS spent 
the early months of 2000 attempting to agree the principles on which to base the next draft. 
Progress was also slow, not least because of continuing disagreements over the inclusion of the 
MEPP in the strategy. Existing CP already covers the political aspects of the conflict. The fear 
was that the extension of QMV under the CS could serve to weaken positions already agreed 
by unanimity under "common positions".  
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 As a result of these and other disagreements, no new draft of the CSM had emerged before the 
spring of 2000. However, concerned that they had little to show for the Mediterranean, in May 
2000, the Portuguese Presidency revived the discarded Finnish draft in order to amend it in time 
for the forthcoming Feira European Council. This revised "Finnish" draft was the text of the 
strategy adopted by the European Council. Rather, in some respects the resulting document 
reads less like a strategy than an inventory of existing policies and activities, adding to the EMP 
framework developments within the EU since 1995. These include the ESDP, co-operation in 
combating crime under the third pillar and in other areas, such as immigration and asylum, now 
brought under the first pillar.  
 
The Santa Maria da Feira European Council, held on 19-20 June 2000, adopted the CSM16. 
One of the most striking aspects of the CSM is the history of its adoption. For a long time, it was 
assumed that the CSM would not be adopted at Feira. However, the CSM was agreed before 
parliamentary scrutiny could take place. It appears that the Portuguese Presidency were 
anxious to produce something to show at the end of their Presidency, and thus the CSM was 
moved from "pending" to "urgent" status. Portugal wanted to conclude the CSM because it had 
inherited a "mandate" to do so from the previous Finnish Presidency, and that it succeeded, not 
with any magic device, but because the work was quite well advanced by the Finnish and 
therefore with some more time the strategy for the Mediterranean was approved.  
3.2. Main Reasons for the Adoption of the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean 
 
The adoption of the CSM in Feira was not causal, as it was the case of the precedent CS. We 
can underline several reasons that led to the adoption of this instrument, reasons which 
reflected the goal of the EU to articulate a single EFP towards the Mediterranean. Firstly, we 
can speak about the special attention since the Barcelona Conference by three Mediterranean 
states, France, Spain and, in second term, Italy, in the Mediterranean policy of the EU. The 
German reunification, the accession in 1995 of three EFTA countries and the ongoing 
enlargement process reformulated the geopolitical direction of the EU, and the political and 
economic centre of gravity of the EU turned to the East. Five years after the Barcelona 
Declaration, the same actors, with high involvement of France and Spain, put on the table the 
need of a renewal of the EU Mediterranean policy. We must say that the fact of having three of 
the five largest MS highly involved in this policy is crucial if we want to understand the adoption 
and the articulation of the CSM.  
 
Secondly, this general political impetus in the Mediterranean policy since 1995 was notably 
increased during 1999 and 2000. The stagnation of the EMP after the Stuttgart Ministerial 
Conference (April 1999) led to a general pessimism concerning the actions of the EU in the 
Mediterranean region. The elaboration of the Charter for Peace and Stability for the 
Mediterranean was a very important step, but the almost inexistent hope for its adoption 
undermined its value. Furthermore, the MEPP did not register advances, and the involvement 
and effectiveness of the EU in this process were under constant discussion. That is, the 
optimism generated by the new Treaty had no synergy with a more efficient and visible EFP. 
The political importance of the difficult situations of both processes for the EU was high, and the 
credibility of the EFP in general, and of the EU as an actor in the Mediterranean, in particular, 
was at stake. The third reason of the adoption was the enormous importance of the 
Mediterranean region for the EU, as was stated and well explained before.  
3.3 Purposes of the Common Strategy 
 
All the above factors converged during the Portuguese Presidency of January-June 2000. In a 
difficult period for the EU Mediterranean policy, the pressures of the Spanish and French 
diplomatic services increased, and the desire of a renewal of the existing instruments was more 
and more present. With this mental and political framework, the Feira European Council 
adopted the CSM, in which we can identify three main purposes17.  
 
The first one is to establish a more general framework for the EU Mediterranean policy, with 
clear “common interests” and with a genuine and coherent EFP. So, we can say that the initial 
purpose of the CSM was to apply a new CFSP instrument, created by the ToA, to the Europe’s 
southern periphery. The CSM expresses the EU’s determination to pursue a coherent policy 
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towards the region. The second general purpose was to develop and give an added value to the 
EMP and its subsequent acquis with a more long-term and strategic view. The CSM was 
adopted with the aim to “try to make the existing policy work”18, emphasising and building on the 
strengths of the EMP. That is, the CSM wanted to make the EMP more action-oriented and 
results-driven19. One of the underlying purposes in relation to the EMP was the attempt to 
overcome the divorce of the political and diplomatic dimensions between the EMP and the 
MEPP20, established explicitly since 1995. Finally, the third purpose concerned specifically the 
MEPP. It that point, the CSM wanted to enhance and redefine, with a strategic planning, the 
Union’s position and role as a promoter of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace and of 
prosperity for the region, and as a key player in the political and economic process21. This 
redefinition was to be undertaken both in political terms vis-à-vis the contending parties and in 
terms of concrete actions22, by the articulation of new instruments, strategies and policies. 
 
4. The CONTENTS of the Common Strategy  
4. 1. The structure of the Common Strategy  
 
In geographical scope, the CSM deals with the same 12 partners as the EMP, with the notable 
addition of Libya, which was excluded in 1995 pending progress in the Lockerbie affair. It does 
not deal with them all equally: bilateral relations between the EU and the three applicant 
countries (Turkey, Malta and Cyprus) are omitted and there are special provisions relating to 
Libya. It also does not deal with any Balkan country, as the intention, at least, was that they 
would be considered together separately using a fourth CS. So far, there is no evidence that 
such a CS will ever appear. In principle, the CSM is intended to complement, and not to 
compete with the EMP. The CSM contains thirty-seven statements and is divided into four main 
parts. Amid a lot of political, economic, judicial, ecological and social challenges facing the 
Mediterranean, the CSM invited the Mediterranean partners to work together with a vision of 
developing a prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region23.  
 
The Part I. Vision of the EU for the Mediterranean region contains the general guidelines of the 
EU in relation to the region and expresses the main assumptions in the articulation of the 
instruments. The second part of the CSM is dealing with the EU's objectives for the 
Mediterranean. It declares that the EU wants to make 'significant and measurable progress' in 
the EMP, 'establish a common area of peace and stability' and 'shared prosperity through an 
economic and financial partnership', to establish a social, cultural and 'human affairs' 
partnership between 'cultures and civil society', to promote the 'core values embraced by the 
EU' (human rights, democracy, good governance, transparency and the rule of law, fight against 
intolerance, racism and xenophobia), encourage free trade, investment in the region,  
'strengthen cooperation' in the area of JHA24. The Part II. Objectives clearly shows the main 
goals of the CS, and presents a long list of EU initiatives in the areas of politics and security.  
 
The Part III. Areas of Action and Specific Initiatives describes the different fields of the action of 
the CSM. Statement 11 establishes that the EU will undertake a comprehensive review of the 
EMP with the aim of reinvigorating it and making it more action-oriented and results-driven. 
Furthermore, statement 12 says that the EU will endeavour to pursue the following specific 
initiatives, without precluding possible new initiatives. In CFSP, the CSM covers political 
dialogue, security, democracy, and human rights. Its aim is to strengthen political dialogue at 
three levels, around an increasing number of objectives25: bilaterally; in the framework of the 
EMP, including the Charter for Peace and stability after its entry into force; and multilaterally. 
The main characteristic of this part is that it only describes where the EU wants to be an actor 
and puts forward a long list of possible and already existing activities. However, it does not 
specify how the defined goals could be reached. Except for the more action-oriented title it is 
not really possible to see a difference with the objectives26. This has also been criticised by the 
HR report on CS presented to the GAC in January 2001, which declared, “as far as substance 
was concerned, the CS did not cover new ground and instead tended to become inventories of 
existing policies”.  
 
The Part IV. Instruments and Means contains the provisions concerning the institutions involved 
in the CSM and the means available to its implementation. This part expresses concern for 
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coordination among the Council, the Commission and MS to give effectiveness and coherence 
for EFP in the Mediterranean27. The Part V establishes that the CSM shall apply from the date 
of its publication (22.07.2000) for an initial period of four years, and it shall be published in the 
OJEC. 
4.2. The CSM and Horizontal Coherence of EFP: a Real Motivation?  
 
The EFP system is characterised by its three-pillar structure, separating trade and economic 
affairs from foreign policy and internal affairs. One of the resulting problems is that the 
intergovernmental CFSP does not have many policy instruments at its disposal since these are 
mostly located in the communitarian first pillar. Ends and means are separated. Moreover, the 
various actors as well as inter-institutional struggles produce a slow decision-making process, 
which in turn is subject to lowest common denominator results. 
 
How does the CSM deal with the horizontal coherence problems of EFP? The CSM could 
improve these problems since it reminds that the Council and the Commission shall, in 
accordance with Article 3 TEU, ensure the consistency, unity and effectiveness of the Union's 
action. The CSM gives a constitutional basis to such a cross-pillar approach and introduces a 
way to bridge those pillars. Even the very critical report produced by the HR notes that, despite 
of all their imperfections the CS has contributed to putting all EU objectives and means in the 
areas covered in a comprehensive, cross-pillar approach.  
 
Regarding CFSP measures adopted under a CS, as Solana stated, since a CS provides 
automatically for adoption by QMV of any implementing act there is no need for the common 
strategy itself to provide for a legal base for implementation on CFSP. In this sense, the CSM 
could play a significant role. In practice, the CSM helps to make EFP look more coherent. The 
main consequence is that the Commission feels backed by the Council and especially the 
European Council in its implementation of EFP. In times of an institutional malaise, especially in 
the Commission, the support for the Commission's activities from the highest level is very 
welcome. 
 
EU institutions and bodies, each one acting within the powers attributed to them by the Treaties, 
implement the CSM. In CFSP aspects, the High Representative, supported by the Special 
Envoy for the MEPP, shall assist the Council and the Presidency in its implementation. The 
Commission shall be fully associated in this task. This fact is highly doubtful, given that the 
Commission sometimes follows a logic based on the though “I have my own instrument in the 
relations with the Mediterranean. Why should I contribute in the CSM?”28. Furthermore, the 
Council and the Commission shall ensure the consistency, unity and effectiveness of the UE 
action. The effectiveness of the CSM will be optimised by ensuring the greatest possible 
coherence between the various instruments and areas of activity undertaken by the Union. MS 
shall contribute to the objectives of this CS by making appropriate and coordinated use of all 
relevant instruments and means available to them policies outside the Barcelona Declaration.  
 
At the same time, this raises the question whether there is a risk of  'intergovernmental 
contamination' of the Commission's supranational activities. Even though the Commission has 
the right to make initiatives in the CFSP sphere, it has been reluctant to do so because of that 
risk. Moreover, the Commission is not eager to use communitarian instruments to implement 
CFSP decisions on which it has had little or no influence and to be reduced to a mere execution 
body. The CSM is an example to illustrate this risk since the Commission's positions were 
hardly respected during the drawing of the document.29 Furthermore, even though the roles of 
the European Council and the Council have been strengthened with the CSM, the procedures 
outside the second pillar have not been changed (as confirmed in the declaration annexed to 
the CSM). Hence, the Commission remains in charge of implementing many decisions taken in 
the EMP context, continues to prepare and give follow up to the Euro-Med Committee's 
meetings30 and negotiate association agreements (although under strict supervision of the MS).   
 
The Council, the Commission and the MS shall review existing actions, programmes, and 
instruments, and shall ensure their consistency with this CSM. To ensure co-ordination, MS 
shall make additional efforts to co-ordinate their actions vis-à-vis the Mediterranean. In addition, 
those participating in other forums shall do it in a way consistent with the objectives of this CS. 
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The representatives of the MS and the Commission in the Mediterranean partners shall take 
into full account this CSM when co-ordinating their activities on the ground. The Council, the 
Commission and the MS shall work towards more effective co-operation with regional and 
international organisations. The European Council requests the Council the priorities for the 
implementation, the revision and evaluation, the analysis of the Mediterranean situation and the 
recommendations. The Commission shall contribute to the above within its competence. The 
EU and its MS shall work closely together with the Mediterranean partners when 
complementing this CSM, in particular through the Association Agreements and the Euro-
Mediterranean Committee for the EMP. 
 
4.3 Main issues and Added Values of the Common Strategy  
 
One area in which the CSM differs from the EMP is in that the former explicitly includes the 
MEPP, although it is only in the context of a comprehensive settlement that the strategy 
envisages any participation by MS in the implementation of security arrangements on the 
ground. What is new and unique however is the effort to combine, under one heading, the 
established EU policy towards the MEPP with its developmental partnership programme for the 
whole non-EU Mediterranean region. Prior to this these two EU strategies have been kept apart, 
maybe artificially, since naturally the one required the other in order to be successful. The issue 
of the linkage between the EMP and the MEPP caused considerable controversy during the 
negotiations on the CS because some MS had misgivings both about bringing the highly 
divisive Middle East problems into the context of the EMP and about potential QMV on 
implementing measures regarding the Middle East if the EU's role in the Peace Process would 
be part of the CSM. 
 
Secondly, the CSM tries to cover the energy relations. No economic issue is as important to EU-
Mediterranean relations as energy. The interdependence between the Mediterranean EU 
countries and the non-EU Mediterranean countries is overwhelming. The reliance of the EU on 
this trade appears to be a major factor in the EU's policies towards the Mediterranean countries. 
The development of international energy trade is of paramount importance in the Mediterranean 
region because of the need to guarantee energy supplies to the importing countries of the EU 
and to secure markets for the exporting countries of North Africa. This is half of what the EMP, 
and subsequently the CSM, is about.  
 
Thirdly, while oil and gas account for a large proportion of many Mediterranean countries' 
income, they are still by and large agricultural economies. The EU is very keen to impress upon 
the Mediterranean countries the benefits of free trade, but there is a danger: free trade alone 
cannot lead to development or solve problems such as poverty, demographic growth or 
environmental degradation. On the contrary, it may exacerbate such problems. Unfortunately for 
the Mediterranean partners, who specialise in the production of fruit and vegetables, the EU 
does not appear to be too interested in liberalising trade in agriculture. Thus the CSM may be of 
limited value until progress is made on allowing the Mediterranean states access to the 
European market in agricultural products, particularly as the trade in agricultural goods is of 
greater importance to the Mediterranean partners than to the EU. 
 
Then, JHA field is regarded by many as one of the most significant new aspects of the CSM. 
Naturally, there is a great incentive to view not just migration, but drug trafficking and organized 
crime, as matters regarding urgent action on an international scale. These are areas where joint 
action is imperative. Finally, only one sentence of the entire CSM is devoted to the environment. 
It reads "The EU will ensure that account is taken of the need to promote better integration of 
environmental concerns with a view to the sustainability of economic development." This seems 
strange. The Mediterranean Sea is in places badly polluted and the area in general is 
increasingly prone to environmental problems, including desertification. The environment is an 
issue that by its nature calls for international co-operation.  
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5. Analysis of the Contents 
 
Having seen the precedents, the purposes and the structure of the CSM, it is now the moment 
to analyse its provisions. We can draw up some general remarks about this CS. Firstly, it was 
adopted at the highest political level, that of the European Council. In principle, this fact assures 
legitimacy of the strategy, the coherence of the instrument, its continuity, the articulation of a 
three-pillar policy, and the involvement of all EU institutions and the MS. Secondly, it is 
conceived as an overall instrument of the EFP which includes further areas, given its aim to 
establish a general and long-term policy. The most remarkable areas are the environmental 
concerns, the prospects of economic sustainability, and the field of JHA. But the CSM has also 
two main lacks, namely the agriculture and the free movement of people. That is, it puts 
together all EU objectives and areas covered in a  comprehensive, cross-pillar approach.  
 
Thirdly, we can observe that, despite the institutional configuration of the CSM, the main actors 
involved in its conception and implementation are the ongoing Presidencies31, France and 
Spain, and the Council. Maybe the two great questions about the actors of the CSM are to what 
extent the Commission works closely with the Presidency, on the one hand, and how the 
Mediterranean partners involvement in the implementation of the strategy is achieved, on the 
other. Another aspect related to the actors involved relates to the implementation of CFSP 
aspects. The strategy states that the Special Envoy for the MEPP, Miguel Angel Moratinos, will 
support the HR32. In a framework of a lack of clear and explicit mandate for the HR concerning 
the Mediterranean, and with no provisions concerning hierarchy between them, the questions 
about the added value of this interplay is important. The fact of having two great political 
personalities, with an enormous diplomatic profile and who were the main contributors of the EU 
to the EMP33, puts on the table the possibility of overlapping competences, functions and, of 
course, contributions and ideas.  
 
Fifthly, we can observe that the CSM provisions present the same problem than the whole EFP: 
the lack of coherence of this instrument is due to the weak articulation of common priorities and 
interests towards the region. Sixthly, the CSM reiterates the importance of the Charter for 
Peace and Stability but it gives no concrete and explicit mandate to its adoption. The Feira 
European Council did not establish a deadline for the Council or for the institutions of the EMP 
for its adoption.  
 
Finally, we can observe a useful and positive contribution in the fact that the CSM links the 
successful development of the EMP to the conclusion and ratification of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements. This strategy was used by the EU with regard to the CEEC, in the 
sense that the Europe Agreements are the basis for the enlargement negotiations. 
 
 
6. The Barcelona Process and the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean  
 
 
The first question to ask about the real effectiveness of the CSM and its added value is the 
relationship with the EMP. In this respect, there are several doubts about the contribution or the 
added value of the CS in relation to the EMP. The EMP dealt with the majority of the CSM 
issues. By the time the CSM was agreed in 2000, however, it was felt by some in the EU that 
the Process was in need, as the European Commission put it, of "reinvigorating". In September 
2000, the Commission identified several areas of concern, which were serious obstacles for the 
success of the EFP in the  Mediterranean34, and which had to be addressed in the new 
instrument.  
 
Five years after the start of the Barcelona process it has clearly lost a lot of its original impetus. 
There was thus the question of what to do next. After the Vienna European Council it was felt 
that a CSM would be a useful tool to reinvigorate Barcelona and to introduce areas, such as 
JHA and ESDP, that had either been left out or that were new. There was some support for this. 
It was argued that the mere existence of a CSM would help: the primary external purpose 
appears to be a general reaffirmation of the Union's major political and economic interests in the 
region and its commitment to further progress with the EMP model established by the Barcelona 
Declaration in 1995.  
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However, to some witnesses, there is a doubt as to whether there is any value added aspect to 
the CSM, or indeed to any other CS. The following question needed to be asked: the CSM was 
set out five years after the inception of the EMP. It is similar, both in wording and in contents, to 
the Barcelona Declaration. Given the difficulties and obstacles encountered by the EMP so far, 
what value can the CSM now add to it? The answer is that it adds to the EMP by putting the 
EU's input into relations with the Mediterranean into a coherent framework, thus speeding up 
internal EU decision-making on Mediterranean issues. But other witnesses have found it hard to 
define what this means.  
 
A CS is no more than a formal framework. It spells out what the main EU interests in the region 
are and by what general means they might be pursued. Although it sets the stage upon which 
future actions can be taken, it is quite shallow on what specific action the EU will introduce over 
the next four years in order to further these goals. The CS thus consists of general options and 
guidelines and no more should be expected of such a document. Other existing instruments 
already covered the priorities identified in the strategies, namely the PCA with Russia and the 
Ukraine or the EMP. The CS has very little added value compared to these already agreed 
policies and the very good taken of that is that practically the CS of the Balkans was 
abandoned. 
 
Even less supportively, it appears to be a cosmetic exercise, bland and meaningless, and 
written in terms so all encompassing as to be worthless. Javier Solana, in his report about the 
CS (see Annexes), says that the wide scope of the CS and the particular, sometimes detailed 
concerns of individual MS resulted in a "Christmas tree" approach based on the "lowest 
common denominator" where MS and the Commission insisted on covering all possible aspects 
of relations, including so many different issues in the CS that in the end it became difficult to 
distinguish priorities from questions of secondary importance. When applied to the 
Mediterranean, the perceived lack of added value of the CS compared with the already 
comprehensive Barcelona process and the difficulties in defining the relationship between the 
CS and the EU's role in the MEPP have put the consistency of the EU's approach towards the 
region into question. 
 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
There are some ambiguities implicit in the CSM, which need to be clarified. The main question 
is, of course, "who is in charge" of the CSM? A coherent instrument of EFP needs a coherent 
institutional configuration, and the clear and first answer is, of course, the Presidency35. But, to 
what extent, for example, can the HR take initiatives on the basis of the CSM? Will the 
Commission, given its budgetary role and control over the MEDA funding line take a higher 
profile than the Council or MS in implementing the CSM? Is the strategy as "watertight" from 
subsidiary policy implementation under QMV? The risk of confusion might arise when the 
existing EC, EU and national instruments and means are coordinated. Maybe the Council 
should effectively coordinate these resources and ensure coherence with regard to the 
instruments for achieving such a synergy36.    
 
The second conclusion about the CSM is that it is still not evident what the added value of the 
CSM is over and above the EMP. The CSM has succeeded in the articulation of a single policy 
of the EU “in an area where the MS have important interests in common”. Really, the CSM is a 
framework for the EFP in this area and provides a strategic vision for the EFP37. We can say 
that the EU has a real policy towards the Mediterranean, a policy with its own objectives, means 
and instruments. But this fact does not imply that this policy is coherent, and this lack of 
coherence is clear in terms both of its internal articulation and the relationship with the other 
existing policies, namely the EMP. Seen in its worst light as a distraction from existing policy 
objectives, there is a danger that the CSM has diluted some of the achievable aspects of the 
EMP.  
 
However, the launch of the CSM also coincided with the Commission reflections on the 
shortcomings of the Barcelona model. Addressing these should become the focus for future 
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action, rather than the CSM itself. The more fundamental question of whether the scale and 
scope of Barcelona is too broad to permit of substantive progress in the near future has not, 
however, yet been addressed. The “comprehensive review of the Barcelona Process" proposed 
under Article 11 CSM could, in full consultation with the EU's Mediterranean partners, examine 
ways in which smaller-scale, sub-regional objectives might be met. That is, the CSM should 
focus its targets. Given existing southern Mediterranean concerns over the CSM, the EU needs 
to establish the timeframe, content and participation in this review process with some urgency. It 
is clear that the lack of prior consultation with regional partners has constituted one of the 
problems with the CSM. Even though intended as an internal, EU-only exercise, the unclear 
message sent to the region about the real purposes of the CSM constitutes an obstacle to 
increasing the visibility of the EU's activities in the region.  
 
The synergy between the CSM and the EMP is of crucial importance for the Mediterranean, for 
the CSM itself and for the EFP. Having the CSM as a real strategic and solemn document, the 
EMP should be the operational dimension of the CSM to be effectively implemented. The EMP 
has a well-structured organisation, and its involvement should be beneficial for the CSM. This 
engagement should profit from the knowledge, the resources and the instruments used within 
the EMP, imply a better management of the above mentioned, with a more long-term and 
general perspective, focusing on structures, articulate mechanism to ensure that the 
Commission should play a more dynamic and political role in this new framework and increase 
the instruments destined to soft security concerns and to the societies, that is should increase 
the real impact of the CSM in the people. A combination of the political aspects of the CSM with 
the well-established financial, human and cultural instruments of the EMP should have a really 
positive effect. At its best, the CSM might be perceived as an exercise in emphasising and 
building on the strengths of EMP, while highlighting areas where future actions might be 
concentrated, as well as incorporating new areas which did not exist at the time that Barcelona 
was launched38. 
 
The EU should define clear leadership roles in both the EMP and the CSM in order to articulate 
the stated priority it attaches to the Mediterranean. The EU should in its management 
procedures identify the actors and/or agencies who should be expected to champion the region 
in general and the different dimensions of policy in particular. There is a growing requirement for 
the EU's Mediterranean partners to find a specific point of contact within the EU not only to 
channel their concerns in more positive ways, but also to respond to their concrete requests. 
Moreover, as the Barcelona Process and the MEPP are two different processes which could not 
be separated, but which are complementary to each other, the different actors in chapter I of the 
EMP and the EU-actors being responsible for the MEPP (for instance Moratinos) should co-
ordinate their work more effectively. Moratinos must have an official mandate to attend the 
meetings of the EMP and must be recognised as an expert in this field of work.    
 
In addition, despite the CSM, the main contribution of the EU to the MEPP is based on the 
same instruments than always. That is, the articulation of the EU as an important actor in this 
process is still developed by the Special Envoy and the financial contribution to the Palestinian 
Authority. In addition,  the CSM has not helped the EU to play a more active role in the MEPP39, 
which is its main goal concerning the Middle East. The contribution to the consolidation of 
peace in the Middle East once a comprehensive peace settlement has been achieved seems a 
vague and limited objective for such an instrument, if a single, long-term and coherent policy 
towards the Mediterranean is to be articulated. This “exclusion” of the MEPP reduces 
considerably the added value of the CS40. The lack of general or concrete provisions concerning 
proposals or contributions by the EU, and the clear reference to the post conflict resolution 
stage, are the most powerful signs of the almost inexistent involvement of the CSM within the 
MEPP. And, furthermore, the lack of provisions about how this peace can be achieved is a 
tremendous weakness. 
 
The first and most important conclusion about the CSM and the coherence of EFP is clear: the 
CSM provides a potential instrument of the articulation of a coherent EFP towards the 
Mediterranean, but the problem lies in the political will of the MS for its implementation. It puts 
together all EU objectives and means in the areas covered in a comprehensive, cross-pillar 
approach, and it sets the global vision of the Union in the Mediterranean. The provisions 
contained in the CSM are a general, strategic, long-term, coherent, integrated and cross-pillar 
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approach for the external action of the MS and the EU in the region, and they include 
statements concerning the flexibility of decision-making (QMV), the means available for the 
implementation (EU and MS instruments) and several dimensions and areas included. And it 
has two main added values: it gives visibility to the EFP, with a high political profile and clear 
political objectives, and it introduces fresh ideas and impulses to the EU’s Mediterranean 
policy41. But, as in many spheres of the European integration, the willingness of MS to 
implement and put into practice the objectives contained is far from reality. That is the real 
problem not only of the CSM, but also of the CS as a CFSP instrument.  
 
The CSM gives the incentive to bridge the pillars but it does not help to overcome the problems 
that stem from different decision-making procedures under the respective pillars. These 
procedures continue to follow different logics, especially since the QMV question has done little 
to align EC and CFSP practices42. Moreover, the institutions remain very cautious to protect 
their competences. A real improvement of the CSM is that the involvement of the Commission 
should be focused not only in the budgetary dimension of the act, but also in the strategic 
planning, the elaboration and of course the implementation. These decisions must used all the 
possibilities, resources and instruments of the EFP.        
 
The real reason for the adoption of the CSM was twofold: first of all, the Portuguese Presidency 
wanted to have something important in June. And, secondly, some MS wanted to 
counterbalance the political focus of the EU towards the East during 1999, translated in the 
adoption of the two previous CS43. The main weakness of the CSM is that (paradoxically) is not 
seen as a “strategy” at all44. The CSM is very comprehensive, and includes a large number of 
pints that still need to be clarified45. Apart from standing that the Mediterranean is of strategic 
importance to the Union, the document does not establish a clear hierarchy of short, medium 
and long-term objectives towards achieving a “prosperous, democratic, stable and secure 
region”. It follows a “Christmas tree approach”, repeating all kind of activities already existent 
and adding new ones, but without clear priorities or focus on certain themes/regions.  
 
CSM also suffers from a gap between its apparent potential to act and its actual performance. 
As is the case of most areas of EFP, there are contradictions between the particularly ambitious 
objectives of CFSP and the means available to the Union for achieving those objectives, which 
did not live up to expectations or provide adequately for the matters at stake. The objectives 
and the means are virtually indistinguishable, yet neither addresses the key issue of how 
current practice –if indeed deficient, or insufficiently visible- will be improved upon46. The ToA 
and the instrument of CS try to overcome this problem of EFP. That is, they try to close the 
famous concept by Christopher Hill of “capabilities-expectations gap”47. Furthermore, the 
practice of CFSP shows some examples of dubious decisions when the requirement of 
coherence with EC policies is taken into account. The case of the CSM is also clear in this 
respect, given that it reflects the difficulty in maintaining a watertight separation between the two 
pillars, in particular when policies vis-à-vis third countries are at stake. 
 
The more distant objectives of the CSM—such as the promotion of democratic governments—
might be built into smaller scale initiatives in conjunction with regional partners. The region will 
reject EU initiatives if they are not consulted, especially policies which appear to be conceived 
as directives on how to run their lives. It is also important that the CSM should not inadvertently 
distract attention from the value of the specific Association Agreements between the EU and 
many Mediterranean countries and from the need to complete them where they are not in force. 
MS have yet to articulate clear priorities towards the Mediterranean as perceived under the 
CSM. Most policy positions are articulated between MS, or in terms not easily translatable into 
concrete policy initiatives.  
 
The CSM also shows that MS persist in maintaining national sovereignty in foreign policy, and 
they are prepared to accept only some intensification of institutional arrangements and decision-
making rules for JA to contribute to a more coherent EFP. The implementation of the outputs is 
another reality. MS only accept the Union’s interests only when they do not affect their national 
interests, and  the CSM is a clear example: the aims declared in its text are by far the most 
ambitious and most comprehensive project in the region, but no JA or CP implementing it has 
been adopted. In fact, the implementation of the CS is reduced to the adoption by each 
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Presidency of a Implementation Plan, which only stress the priorities and objectives in the 
implementation, but with no concrete measures or policies48.  
 
The three implementation Plans until now have focused on: the reinvigoration of the EMP; the 
strengthening of the political and security-related dialogue; the establishment and development 
of a dynamic as well as human economic and financial partnership; the promotion of co-
operation in the JHA area as well as in social, cultural and human affairs; and the insurance that 
the EU assumes its rightful role within the MEPP49 (see Annexes).  Even the greater coherence 
and continuity trough enhanced co-ordination of the working plans drawn up by successive 
Presidencies50 that is not enough. The European Council gave little by way of guidelines, so 
successive Presidencies have to develop their own approaches, subject to long and detailed 
negotiating processes and with no real implementation.51 
 
Another conclusion relates to the absence of provisions concerning the co-operation with the 
United States, fact that increases the weakness of the EU as a global actor. On the one hand, 
the CSM is conceived as an overall instrument of EFP, which tries to establish a common 
political framework as general as possible, and which do not provide for a further involvement in 
specific policy areas, such as the MEPP or the agriculture issues. But, on the other hand, there 
are no provisions concerning the dialogue, co-ordination or interplay with the other major third 
actor involved in the Middle East, that is the United States. This fact expresses some of the 
miseries of the EFP 
 
A final concern is the future of the CSM. Most evidence from MS seemed to suggest that while it 
may have added little to the EMP, it would also, as a result, do little harm. It is also clear that 
bilateral relations between MS and individual Mediterranean partners remain the essence and 
basis for relations in the region. Given the lack of enthusiasm for pursuing its more ambitious 
and over-generalised aims, the EU needs to resolve whether successive EU Presidencies will 
continue to be obliged to spend time assessing progress under the CSM and setting out future 
objectives as is required by a CS. The introduction by each Presidency of a new working plan 
with new priorities has so far failed to add to the objective of deploying a consistent and 
coherent EU approach and has strengthened the impression of stop and go policies. 
Alternatives might be either to reformulate the CSM to represent a genuine and progressively 
attainable set of priorities towards the region, or for the CSM to be quietly dropped. In the future, 
the CSM should focus the resources to be used and the items to be addressed.  
 
 
Common Strategies so far has not yet contributed to a stronger and more effective EU in 
international affairs52. Three main questions have to be asked about the CSM. Firstly, whether 
CS is over-ambitious at this stage of the EU's institutional development, except as inventories of 
what is already being done. Secondly, whether the motivation of extending EU external action 
via QMV procedures is a sensible basis for strategy. Thirdly, whether the CS in practice is 
applied to the right targets. The reason why the Mediterranean was chosen as a focus for a CS 
appears to have prejudiced both its content and its utility in addition to the EMP. However, while 
some areas of the CSM are consonant with the aspirations of the EMP, there is a need for 
greater clarity and explanation in some of the newer areas 
 
In respect of the CS as an instrument, we have to question about whether the Mediterranean is 
a coherent region with which the EU could deal as a single unit using a single policy instrument; 
and if so, whether the establishment of a CS could add to the mechanisms already in use 
through the EMP. The genesis of the CSM, and the degree of consultation undertaken before its 
implementation, are also topics of some interest. About the CSM per se, much evidence 
focused on the EU's limited role in the MEPP and its relevance to the EMP and the CSM, and 
on the disbursement of funds under the MEDA programme of aid to Mediterranean partner 
states. Other questions are the role of energy policy in EU-Mediterranean relations and on the 
JHA angle of the CSM, and on the rather limited environmental aspect of the CSM. CS are 
hampered by insufficient or non-existent inter pillar forward planning, this is not to say that there 
are no principles underlying EFP activities. To put arrangements about coherence in a solid 
basis, it might be advisable to formally agree between Presidency and Commission on a set of 
ground rules to be followed by those involved in ensuring day-to-day coherence between the 
external relations of the EC and the CFSP. Even if a CS is adopted, this does not guarantee a 
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smooth process of implementation. Each implementation decision can always be contested by a 
government, which considers that it does not fall within the framework of CS because it relates 
to another topic or because it does not respect the general objectives. 
 
 EFP, above all, is a careful balance of the interests between all MS. We must also consider 
that, in fact, the CSM was adopted in a time of transition of EFP: new provisions of ToA were 
being put into effect; the HR, the PPEWU, the new troika, the new instrument of CS, the 
inclusion of Petersberg Tasks, QMV, the mechanism of constructive abstention. In this respect, 
the CSM and CS in general have not acquired the level of maturity and implantation that the 
other innovations of the ToA have done. 
 
In short, the CSM, and CS in general, are perceived as a tremendous failure of EFP. In the 
future, and waiting for the revision of the first CS, in 2003, we can say that the should be less 
declarative and less ambitious, and they should be more operational, more concrete, more 
focused in their objectives and maybe confidential.   
 
We can extrapolate some conclusions of the CSM to the EFP. The absence of clear priorities in 
EU’s Mediterranean policy and the lack of coherence between this policy and other European 
external policies are common observations. The case of the MEPP is notable. The credibility 
and success of important policies, such as the CSM, depend on the coherence of European 
policies and actions, as a whole. In addition, and maybe as a result of the first point, the EU’s 
partners have to deal with different interlocutors on different subjects, some of which are subject 
to the six-monthly rotation of the Presidency, specifically in the implementation of the CSM. As a 
result, there are problems of continuity and coherence of the EFP, and both negotiations with 
the Mediterranean countries and the implementation of EU policies can be disrupted by internal 
problems of the Union system. 
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